The Concept of Mimesis: Evolution From Plato to Longinus by CHEN, Wei & XIONG, Wangmei
 ISSN 1923-1555[Print] 
ISSN 1923-1563[Online]
   www.cscanada.net
www.cscanada.org
Studies in Literature and Language
Vol. 9, No. 2, 2014, pp. 31-36
DOI: 10.3968/5671
31 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
The Concept of Mimesis: Evolution From Plato to Longinus
CHEN Wei[a];  XIONG Wangmei[b],*
[a]Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China.  
[b]Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China. 
*Corresponding author.
Received 2 July 2014; accepted 5 September 2014
Published online 26 October 2014
Abstract
This essay traces the time-honored literary concept 
“mimesis” from Plato  to Longinus, mainly dealing 
with four classical critics from the Greco-Roman 
period—Plato, Aristotle, Horace and Longinus. Through 
comparison and contrast, it focuses on the “hard-core” 
essence of each critic’s position on and attitude toward 
“literary imitation”, as well as their inheritance in the 
history of literary criticism. The point is to highlight the 
emphasis of each of them, and shed some light to their 
succession and innovation of this important  literary 
concept.
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Nietzsche’s iconoclastic declaration of God’s death 
in the 19th century, an overwhelming doubt has gradually 
sunk in among the modern intellectuals that whether 
there is any ultimate Truth or Reality literary figurein the 
modern world, a world shaped and reshaped by manifold 
forces, such as power and knowledge, mass media and 
mass consumption, new technologies, etc. However, when 
people’s attention is shifted to the boyhood of western 
civilization—the Greco-Roman days, it is the Truth, the 
Reality that has towered above all as the most sacred 
topic ever discussed and meditated by Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle, who form their stance on poetry and poets 
mainly in accordance with their view on the Truth. It is 
against such a context that comes into being the concept 
of mimesis, a concept which is originally closely related 
to philosophy rather than poetry. 
Mimesis, or imitation, the classical concept derived 
from Plato’s ontology and epistemology as well as his 
position on poetry, is further discussed by Aristotle in his 
influential treatise on poetry—Poetics, which serves an 
important purpose in his philosophy as a whole. Later 
on two outstanding literary figures in the Roman period, 
Horace and Longinus, resume the discussion of the 
ancient topic and narrow down the concept of mimesis to 
its literary aspect; the former recognizes the importance 
of imitating nature in a unified harmonious way, but puts 
emphasis on the imitation of the methods or techniques 
of the earlier writers, so as to “put the newly made wine 
into the old bottles” ; the latter, however, upholding the 
sublimity of great thought and “the echo of a great soul” 
(Longinus, 2006, p.98), attaches greater importance to 
the inhalation of “divine vapor” of the great men of old 
and the emulation of the great spirit of others, which in 
essence is also called “imitation”, only that the emphasis 
is shifted from technical copy of the objective to the 
spiritual expression of subjectivity of the writer himself. 
It is Longinus who extends the concept of mimesis to an 
elevated level and lays the foundation for the Romantic 
criticism.
1.  PLATO: POETS PUT IN EXILE FOR 
THEIR IMITATION OF SHADOWS OF THE 
IDEAL 
“It is Plato who bequeaths to the tradition of literary 
criticism of the concept of imitation or mimesis, dominant 
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in literary criticism well into the eighteenth century.” 
(Adams & Searle, 2006, p.8) In The Republic the 
concept of imitation is given two meanings: A broadly 
philosophical one dealing with Plato’s ontology and 
epistemology which argues that the world of sense-
perceptions is but a poor shadow and imitation of a 
higher world where the “Ideals” abound; the other 
concerning literary techniques, namely, the pure 
imitative form where the poet has his personae speak 
instead of himself. 
In regard to the first sense of imitation, it is necessary 
to come back to the topic of where to locate the Truth. In 
Plato’s philosophical system, the world is divided into 
two domains: the phenomenon and the noumenon, or the 
world of sense-perceptions and the world of Ideals. The 
former is an ephemerally ever-changing one where “the 
becoming” is happening at every moment; while the latter 
is eternal and changeless, one that the Truth or the Being 
is its essence. In The Republic through Socrates’s mouth, 
Plato locates Reality in what are called Ideals or Forms 
rather than in the world of appearances or phenomena 
perceived through senses, the latter being mere copies 
or derivatives of the former, thus the unreliability of 
perceptions gained through senses. He continues by 
arguing that the true knowledge can only be attained by 
the rational power exercised in dialectical search which 
would finally lead to the Truth. In Book X he illustrates 
his insistence of banishing the poets from his Republic 
through the example of three “bed”: The Ideal of “bed”; 
the bed made by a carpenter and the “bed” by a painter. 
The bed by a carpenter is a particular derivative from the 
universal and abstract Ideal of “bed”, but the “bed” by 
a painter is more inferior in that it is copied merely by 
“turning a mirror round and round” (Plato, 2006, p.30) 
and therefore an imitation of appearance, or an imitation 
of imitation, thus“ thrice removed from the king and 
from the truth.” (Plato, 2006, p.31) Then Plato makes an 
analogy to the poets:
And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of 
the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as 
his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he 
is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an 
inferior part of the soul...(Plato, 2006, p.35)
Derived from Plato’s point on the Ideals, the theory 
of Book IV that the human soul is constructed in three 
levels accounts for another reason for the exile of the 
poets. Human soul is according to him divided into three 
parts: the rational, the spirited, and the emotional or the 
impulses, the first being the highest part and the third 
being the lowest. He explains that the imitative poet “is 
not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or 
to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will 
prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily 
imitated.” (Plato, 2006, p.35) Hence Plato’s banishing 
the poets from his Republic is justified in an ethical 
sense because the poetry appeals to the lowest part of 
human soul and has the power of “harming even the 
good” :
...therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him(the poet)
into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourished 
and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city 
when the evil is permitted to have authority and the good are 
put out of the way, so in the soul of man, ..., the imitative poet 
implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature 
which has no discernment of greater and less.... (Plato, 2006, 
p.35)
The second meaning of Platonic concept of imitation 
is the technical one. Plato has Socrates speak of Book III 
of the three modes of telling a story: 
...what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to 
you, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly 
imitative—instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy; 
there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only 
speaker—of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the 
combination of both is found in epic, and in several other styles 
of poetry.... (Plato, 2006, p.25) 
The “wholly imitative” form, where the poet has 
his personae speak(thus imitates his personae), as in 
the drama, is the most deceptive of the three because 
the author never speaks in his own voice, thus creating 
an effect of authorial detachment and a space for the 
autonomy of the characters. Such a literary technique 
(though not in a strict sense) as first in details discussed by 
Plato has exerted a great influence on the Western literary 
history. Later writers such as Robert Browning, with his 
dramatic monologue in our mind, and T. S. Eliot, with his 
theory of “depersonalization” and “objective correlative”, 
who claims that “poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, 
but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of 
personality, but an escape of personality” (Eliot, 2006, 
p.807) can all trace their inheritance to Plato’s theory of 
mimesis as a literary technique.
Nevertheless Plato himself cannot completely resist 
the charm of poetry, he spares a little room for the return 
of poetry and comes with a challenge in the last few 
paragraphs of Book X: 
...let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, 
that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered 
State we shall be delighted to receive her... Let them (lovers 
of poetry) show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to 
States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; 
for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I 
mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight? (Plato, 
2006, p.36) 
Later on Plato’s challenge is first accepted by his 
student Aristotle, who, based on his own philosophical 
elaboration on the Truth and the concept of mimesis, 
justifies the existence of poetry (not just “hymns to the 
gods and praises of famous men” as proposed by Plato, 
see Book X, Plato, 2006, p.35 ) and the return of the 
poets.  
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2.  ARISTOTLE: IMITATION JUSTIFIED 
AS A WAY TO ATTAIN THE TRUTH
While the Platonic world of phenomena is one that cannot 
lead to the Truth but only to sense-perceptions, Aristotle 
views the world as an ever-changing process in which the 
Reality is located and manifested by the inward principle of 
order of either a natural or an artificial product. He denies 
the existence of Platonic Ideals apart from the particular 
things and believes that the changing process itself is a 
fundamental reality; any natural process, as raining, or 
artificial process, as the making of a house, is pregnant with 
the Truth and itself a manifestation of Reality. Consequently 
the process of imitation is not one that involves the slavish 
copy of appearances or images, but one that involves the 
inward principle of order and hence the Truth. He gives an 
example of making a house in his Physics:
...Thus if a house, e.g., had been a thing made by nature, it 
would have been made in the same way as it is now by art; and 
if things made by nature were made also by art, they would 
come to be in the same way as by nature.... (Aristotle, 2006, p.50) 
In this example, a natural process is perfectly identified 
with an artificial process. So an analogy can be made to a 
poet’s imitation. A poetic imitation is first of all a process 
which involves the inward principle of order of the work 
itself. The poet “takes a form from nature and reshapes it in 
a different medium.” (Adams & Searle, 2006, p.48)  This 
can be best exemplified by what Aristotle calls “ the soul of 
tragedy”—the action or plot: “... Tragedy is essentially an 
imitation not of persons but of actions and life, of happiness 
and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form 
of action....” (Aristotle, 2006, p.55) The action is a natural 
process itself; by imitating the action, the tragedian takes 
a form from nature and reshapes it in a different medium, 
that is, primarily language and words. Poetry, along with 
other artistic forms such as painting or music, is thus an 
improvement on nature in that “the poet has brought to 
completion what nature, operating with its own principles, 
is still developing.” (Adams & Searle, 2006, p.48)  From 
such a sense poetic imitation is not only justified as a 
process in which the Truth locates, as against Plato’s 
position that poetic imitation is “thrice removed from the 
king and from the truth”, but also further elevated as a way 
to make improvement on what nature is still developing. 
Apart from the view that imitation is itself a natural 
process where Reality locates, Aristotle furthers his point 
in Poetics that poetic imitation is superior to history in 
reflecting truth by proposing his principle of probable or 
necessary:
..The one (history) describes the thing that has been, and the 
other (poetry) a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is 
something more philosophic and of graver import than history, 
since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, 
whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement 
I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably 
or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry...
 ... And for this reason: What convinces is the possible.... 
(Aristotle, 2006, p.57)
He argues in his preference of poetry that what has 
happened (history) only deals with the particulars and 
the accidental, whereas what will probably or necessarily 
happen (poetry) relates to those which are of a universal 
nature. So through poetic imitation, the poet handles 
those events which comply with the principle of probable 
or necessary and therefore advances in truth, a notion 
referring to what things should be rather than what things 
are or have been. So imitation is justified also as a process 
of creation, the poet also the creator. 
Another point Aristotle holds in his Poetics concerning 
imitation is that it is not only a part of human nature, but 
also brings delight to man:
It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to two 
causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation is natural 
to man from childhood,...that he is the most imitative creature in 
the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural 
for all to delight in works of imitation....  (Aristotle, 2006, p.53)
The second point is proved by general human 
experience, for example, though the dead body is painful 
for the human eyes, it is a great delight to see them most 
vividly and authentically represented in paintings. So is 
the poetic imitation. Aristotle not only justifies the delight 
brought by tragedy, but also advances to make efforts to 
lay rules for this form of imitation: he, like a well-trained 
physician, devotes several chapters discussing what kind 
of plot is best for a tragedy, and, how the imitation can 
achieve a moralizing effect, namely, by “arousing pity and 
fear accomplish its catharsis of such emotions”. (Aristotle, 
2006, p.55) Through such efforts he remotely opposes to 
Plato’s dismissal of poetic imitation as a way to corrupt 
the mind of his citizens through its appeals to the lowest 
part of human soul. 
As a conclusion for Aristotle’s contribution to the 
concept of imitation, two points should be noted: first it is 
he who, in opposing to his mentor Plato, locates Reality in 
the process of imitation, thus making justice to poetry as 
an legitimate art form; then he suggests it is part of human 
nature to imitate and delight in the works of imitation, 
and in answering Plato’s doubt about the positive function 
of poetry, (“Is there a use in poetry as well as delight?”, 
see Book X of The Republic, p.36), he proposes catharsis 
of emotions brought by tragedy, hence defending poetic 
imitation from an ethical (or practical) point of view, 
hinting that poetry has a social effect of emotional 
purgation.
3.  HORACE: IMITATION AS REFERENCE 
TO TRADITION AND THE ANCIENT
To the Greeks, who desired only glory, the Muse gave genius 
and greatness of style. Our Roman youth, however, learns 
how to divide the as into hundred parts.... When this interest 
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in commercial gain has stained the soul, how can we expect to 
have poems worthy of being preserved in cedar oil and kept in 
cypress cases?  (Horace, 2006, p.83)
Horace’s confusion is just an epitome of the whole 
Roman society which had undergone a great change 
from the previous Greek period. The utilitarian social 
climate also extends its sweep to the literary arena. The 
eulogy “To the glory that was Greece, and the grandeur 
that was Rome” (Allan Poe’s lyric To Helen）cannot be 
well justified when it comes to literary criticism of the 
Roman period, especially when compared with its Greek 
predecessors. Falling short of philosophic depth and 
metaphysical meditations, the Roman critics focus more 
on technical issues such as rhetoric and composition. 
Horace’s interpretation of literary imitation is no exception 
in sharing the intellectual ethos of his age. Unlike Plato 
and Aristotle, he shifts the object of imitation from Ideals 
or Nature to the exemplary craftsmanship of the ancient 
great, that is, the ancient Greeks such as Homer and the 
great tragedians. In his Art of Poetry, Horace unreservedly 
shows his great love for Greek literature and a eager mind 
to instruct his contemporaries: He proposes to “serve as 
a whetstone which, though it cannot itself do any cutting, 
is able to sharpen steel” and to “teach the duty and office 
of the poet, instruct him where to get his materials....” 
(Horace, 2006, p.83) In order to steer Roman poetry to 
the eminence of that of its Greek counterpart, he makes 
himself clear on the relationship between following the 
ancient tradition and making their own invention:
Either follow tradition or else make what you invent 
consistent.... It is hard to treat a commonly known subject in 
an original way.... In publicly known matters, you will be able 
to achieve originality if you do not translate word for word, 
nor jump into a narrow imitative groove, from which both fear 
and the rules followed in the given work prevent your escape.
(Horace, 2006, pp.80-81)
It is quite obvious that Horace does not attach as much 
importance to originality as the latter writers and critics 
do. Instead he puts emphasis on the literary tradition and 
advocates the emulation of the ancient great. However, 
his concept of imitation of or reference to the ancient 
masters denies a way to translate word for word, or the 
slavish copying of what has been known, but advocates a 
method of infusing into the tradition one’s own invention, 
therefore it is a sort of re-creation. In his praise of 
Homer’s great mastery of handling epic plots, Horace 
further explains his viewpoint on imitation and creation: 
“he (Homer) leaves out what he is afraid he cannot make 
more illustrious with his touch, and he invents, mixing 
fiction with truth, in such a way that the beginning, 
middle, and end are all appropriate with each other.” 
(Horace, 2006, p.81)
All in all, Horace has in Art of Poetry reduced the 
concept of imitation to a technical process of either 
following the great method of the old or making one’s own 
invention based on literary tradition and principles. His 
doctrines for the young learners of the art of imitation— 
“turn to life and real manners as his model, and draw 
from there a living language” (Horace, 2006, p.83)—
are basically concerned with methods or craftsmanship 
of writing, emphasizing art over genius, which is also a 
telling evidence of the literary climate of his time. 
4.  LONGINUS: IMITATION AS A SPIRITUAL 
INTERACTION WITH THE ANCIENT 
Longinus, being a Greek living in the Roman period 
(He, 2012, p.83), bears the mark of both the Roman 
pragmaticis and the depth of Greek thought ; the former 
in the sense that his view on literary imitation serves 
first and foremost the purpose of how to achieve the 
effect of sublimity; the latter in the sense that though 
he also propose to learn from the ancient masters, he 
puts emphasis on the emulation on the spiritual level 
rather than in a technical sense, thus more profound than 
Horace.
In his famous critical essay Tradition and Individual 
Talent, T. S. Eliot points out that the position of a poet is 
based on his interaction with the past great masters:
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. 
His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his 
relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him 
alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the 
dead. (Eliot, 2006, p.807)
Different from the positions of the above-mentioned 
three, Longinus’s concept of imitation is closely related 
to his theory of sublimity, and can too be identified 
as a spiritual interaction with the ancient great minds, 
which involves the subjectivity or imagination of the 
writer himself and can be accordingly divided into three 
stages—the passive reception of sublimity of the old; the 
internalization of sublimity, and the active creation of 
sublimity of one’s own.  
The first stage is to expose one’s soul to the spiritual 
influence of the old masters. It is a passive process which 
echoes with Plato’s term of “divine madness”, (see 
Phaedrus, Plato, 2006, p.36)）but different from it in that 
here the imitative poet does not completely lose himself 
and become a mouthpiece of the divinity. Longinus 
identifies the imitative poet in this first stage with a 
passive female image who becomes pregnant when she 
inhales the “divine vapor”:
For many men are carried away by the spirit of others as if 
inspired, just as it is related to the Pythian priestess when 
she approaches the tripod, where there is a rift in the ground 
which (they say) exhales divine vapor. By heavenly power thus 
communicated she is impregnated and straightway delivers 
oracles in virtue of the afflatus. (Longinus, 2006, p.103)
Then an analogy is made to the imitative poet 
who bears the spiritual influence of the ancient great, 
whose noble soul and thought areis likened to the main 
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stream and whose spiritual inheritance becomes a sort 
of “effluence.” So the imitative poet, no matter how 
little likely to be possessed, is “ thereby inspired and 
succumb to the spell of the others’ greatness.” (Longinus, 
2006, p.83) Even Plato, who had long ago banished the 
emotion-stirring poets from his ideal commonwealth, 
“from the great Homeric source drew to himself in 
numerable tributary streams.” (Ibid) In this first stage, 
the subjectivity of the imitative poet is not involved; he 
only acts as a passive receptor of the “afflatus”, preparing 
for the next stage when the real poet, rather than the 
mouthpiece of a mystic divine force, is gradually taking 
shape. 
The second stage involves a process in which the 
poet’s subjectivity, or imagination, is projected to the 
impression (“This proceeding is not plagiarism; it is like 
taking an impression from beautiful forms or figures or 
other works of art”, see Longinus, 2006, p.103）that 
has already been made on him on the first stage. It is an 
internalization of what has been transported to him under 
the influence of “the others’ greatness”. In this stage the 
poet’s imagination, or phantasia, acts as a major medium 
through which the imitative poet can communicate 
and interact with the past masters. Meanwhile the poet 
himself becomes an actively responsive processor of the 
“effluence”: he has first made what he has received as 
sublimity an integral part of his own creative inspiration, 
and then by the employment of imagination he is ready to 
create new sublimity; he is a receptor of sublimity as well 
as an agent and creator of sublimity. Longinus argues in 
his discussion of images that “imagination is applied to 
every idea of the mind, in whatever form it presents itself, 
which gives birth to speech.” (Longinus, 2006, p.103) 
Such is the process in which a new great piece of literary 
work is made. 
The last stage of this interaction with the ancient great 
minds is the most direct and fierce among the three. If the 
first stage is called a passive and feminine acceptance of 
the “divine vapor”, the second a quiet and gradual internal 
interaction between the poet and the “divine vapor”, then 
the third can be rightfully deemed as, first, a conversation 
whispered through ages between the imitative poet and 
the past great minds as well as the future posterity, and 
then, an intense contention or fight between them on the 
vase battlefield of time and space. 
Concerning the first analogy, Longinus proposes 
a remote dialogue between the imitative poets and 
the ancient greatness. He reminds the poets that when 
conceiving their pieces of sublimity, they should bear in 
mind what the true noble soul would have done or said 
before them if faced with the same situation. Thus he 
suggests that the poets should have a discourse established 
between the present and the past:
When elaborating anything which requires lofty expression 
and elevated conception, (the poet) should shape some idea in 
our minds as to how perchance Homer would have said this 
very thing, or how it would have been raised to the sublime 
by Plato or Demosthenes or by the historian Thucydides. For 
those personages, ...will carry our minds in a mysterious way 
to the high standards of sublimity which are imaged within us. 
(Longinus, 2006, p.103)
And then he continues his proposal that the works 
of imitation should be placed and valued in a historical 
context, with the past, the present and the future 
interacting with one another in the same arena:
What sort of hearing would be Homer, had he been present, or 
Demosthenes have given to this or that when said by me, or how 
would have been affected by other? The the ordeal is indeed a 
severe one, if we presuppose such a tribunal and theatre for our 
own utterances, and imagine that we are undergoing a scrutiny 
of our writings before these great heroes, acting as judges and 
witness. ... In what spirit will each succeeding age listen to me 
who have written thus? (Longinus, 2006, p.103)
He suggests that the contemporary poets and their 
works cannot be indulged in themselves and their petty 
creations; they should bear in mind the “high standard 
of sublimity” of the ancient masters; literary imitation is 
never of a particular age, the voice of the poet is echoing 
through all ages. 
Then the interaction becomes more and more intense 
when Longinus makes Plato a “young champion” 
contending with and fighting against his predecessor, thus 
placing the two interacting parties “face to face” within a 
confrontation full of masculine intensity:
...unless he (Plato) had with all his heart and mind struggled 
with Homer for the primacy, entering the lists like a young 
champion matched against the man (Homer) whom all admire, 
and showing perhaps too much love of contention and breaking 
a lance with him as it were, but deriving some profit from the 
contest none the less. (Longinus, 2006, p.103)
And by a quotation of Hesiod, Longinus admits that 
“this strife is good for mortals” and the interaction evolves 
to a stage where the imitative poet, with the “divine 
vapor” inhaled and internalized as an integral part of him, 
stands tall and struggles for primacy with the ancient great 
on the literary arena of all ages. 
As the conclusion of Longinus’ part it should first be 
noted that his perception of literary imitation has been 
closely intertwined with his theorization of the sublime. 
His phraseology such as “divine vapor”, “afflatus” 
and “effluence” is remotely echoing with Plato, but 
in his further argumentation he deviates by putting 
great emphasis on the subjectivity of the imitative poet 
himself, as opposed to Plato’s assumption that the poet 
is merely a mouthpiece of the divine will. His concept 
of imitation is somewhat similar to Horace but more 
profound in that he focuses on the spiritual level, rather 
than the technical level. And his proposal of a spiritual 
interaction between the contemporaries and the ancient 
masters has inspired certain studies in various fields of 
humanities.
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CONCLUSION 
Tracing the evolution of the concept of mimesis from 
Plato to Longinus, this essay has respectively dwelt 
upon the thought of the four critics, namely, Plato’s 
position that the phenomenal world is an imitation of the 
Ideals and the poets imitates the shadows of the Ideals, 
Aristotle’s justification of imitation as a natural process in 
which Reality locates and manifests itself, and Horace’s 
emphasis on imitating the ancient great in respect to their 
methods and art, and Longinus’ proposal to a spiritual 
imitation and interaction with the ancient masters. As a 
time-honored concept in the history of literary criticism, 
imitation has been an essential topic ever discussed by 
numerous writers and theorists, among whom, these four 
had paved the road for their successors and left their mark 
on the eternal rock of literature. 
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